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Abstract— Because of today’s complexity it is unavoidable for 
most companies to manufacture via corporate networks. However, 
current network models yield a negative correlation between the 
favourable attributes efficiency and flexibility. In this paper a 
network form is suggested which lives up to today’s requirements, 
offering both means of efficiency and flexibility. The network to be 
created must live up to the character of a decentralized network. It 
needs to serve exchange processes resulting from the economic and 
judicial independence of the network partners. Simultaneously, the 
new network form needs to incorporate the ability of being 
coordinated by rules so that it efficiently lives up to the complexity 
challenge. This paper presents approaches for both, the organizational 
design and process design of a rule-based network which is led by a 
network manager. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
HE high complexity of technical systems leads to an 
increasing number of parties and required competences 
involved in the development and manufacturing process. More 
than ever these competences are provided in the form of 
development and production networks. Networks provide an 
essential tool for companies to ensure competitiveness in a 
very punctual way within a macroeconomic context 
[1].Usually, these networks are coordinated by a network 
manager who is an active part of the network. Due to the high 
interdependences of the product components it is inevitable 
that the cooperation partners interact with each other and also 
with the network manager.  
Present coordination theories are based on either a 
hierarchical network structure which results in a loss of 
flexibility or a self-organizing structure which might be more 
effective but is less efficient as the hierarchical structure. 
     In addition today’s development and production 
environment is marked by high dynamics and unpredictability. 
Customers’ needs change rapidly and lead to high costs for 
changes and adoptions of the products.  
     In the context of decentrally organized networks there is 
often a negative correlation to be found between the 
challenges of flexibility and span-of-control. Decentralized  
 
 
 
 
 
organizations hold a high potential of flexibility and response 
time. In addition to this effectiveness potential a minimum of  
span-of-control is required in order to reach the favorable 
efficiency ([2],[3]). The challenge is based on the trade-off 
between an increased flexibility, achieved by giving decision 
making rights to more than just one entity, and the extent of  
span-of-control. This increased flexibility only comes at the 
cost of a lower span-of-control. The decreased span-of-control  
has negative effects on the achievement of the overall network 
optimum and leads to a lower efficiency of the processes. This 
directly leads to higher transaction costs. Figure 1 illustrates 
the mentioned trade-off effects.1. 
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Fig. 1. Trade-off between flexibility and span-of-control 
 
Taking the mentioned problems into account, it becomes 
evident that there is an urgent need to overcome the 
outstanding challenges.  
     In contrast to existing approaches in theory and practice 
this work intends to present a rule-based, implicit guidance 
concept which functions as a framework ensuring the 
protection of interests of all network parties in the sense of a 
network optimum. 
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II. STATE OF THE ART 
Accounting for the interdisciplinary character of networks, 
theories of various disciplines have to be analysed with respect 
to their fit as they might be useful for the network design. It is 
important to note that these theories are not exclusive but 
rather offer different perspectives to the subject of matter.  
  
A.  Negotiation and rule-based coordination approaches  
Lu’s coordination model offers an engineering perspective, 
stating that all engineering activities take place in the context 
of socio-technical problems and therefore are marked by a 
coordination pattern. Lu adds aspects of communicative 
coordination, negotiation and decision-making to the value 
creation process. Experimental-economic theories, e.g. auction 
theory, help in simulating the behavior of these coordination 
systems. [4] 
Based on the coordination theories and specifying these, 
there are first research efforts dealing with the rule-based 
coordination of social systems. However, the rules presented 
in these approaches are only useful to a limited extent for the 
suggested concept due to their generic character. 
 
B.  Approaches for managing network organizations  
Davidow comes up with the vision of ‘virtualizing’ 
enterprise structures [5]. This idea established the network 
paradigm in organization theory and hence the resulting 
coordination patterns. Yet, most works in this field are 
characterized by a rather programmatic nature and thus they 
are difficult to operate. Inter-organizational operations in 
value creation are postulated as success factor; still operational 
concepts in this field are rather limited to normative criteria 
for success, such as trust, rules of fairness or adequate 
technological support like a decent IT infrastructure [6]. A 
systemic management concept has not been developed yet. 
Most of the works from the research area of network 
management theories focus on the process of strategic 
planning and initiating cooperation as well as adequate 
conditions for realizing these. So far no network concept deals 
with an operative approach that supports synergetic value 
creation processes. 
The description and analysis of existing theories is either 
fairly theoretical or rather abstract and thus only useful for 
practice to a limited extent. Most theories do not pay enough 
attention to the special character of non-guided networks [7]. 
Still these concepts offer a basis for coordinating networks 
by means of implicit guidance impulses so that they have an 
impact on operationalizing the stated theories and creating a 
set of rules useful for the guidance of networks. 
 
C.  Systems theory and managerial dynamics 
The systemic perspective of this work is derived from 
systems theory which deals with the elements, structure and 
architecture of systems. Systems theory aims at designing 
organizational concepts and principles in the context of 
various systems, type- and complexity-wise [8]. The 
examination of structural, functional and hierarchical systems 
also refers to aspects of behavior and dependencies within the 
regarded system. 
Because of the complexity of production networks, it is 
essential to take various types of systems respectively 
perspectives into account. Different theories can be allocated 
to various types of systems, thereby illuminating aspects 
which are relevant for this work. 
The ‘Living Systems Theory’ refers to roles, functions and 
levels of living systems ([9],[10]). The theory of social 
systems tackles the interaction of living objects embedded in a 
social fabric. Cybernetics studies the guiding and control of 
systems. The probably most familiar approach is the so-called 
‘Management by Objectives’ which realizes a regulation of a 
system by previously setting objectives [11]. 
Beer’s cybernetics concept focuses on the 
operationalization of cognition relating to the guidance and 
regulation of complex systems which can be applied to the 
design and guidance of socio-technical organizations [12]. An 
essential principle can be seen in the postulation that a control 
unit always needs to be part of the system itself. The control 
unit, spread over the whole system structure, is not forced into 
the system. This requirement conforms to the logic of 
corporate networks which are a set of subsystems each of 
them having its own objectives.  
System-oriented management concepts are based on the 
cognition of systems theory and cybernetics. However, the 
focus is broadened by extending it from economic 
perspectives within an enterprise to a system’s perspective, 
taking the system enterprise - environment into account which 
complies with the perspective of this work. Ulrich’s 
fundamental works serve as a basis for describing a system 
and the function of guiding these. 
The cognition of systems theory and cybernetics provides a 
basis for this work and the combination of these in the context 
of systemic management will be a major objective. 
 
D. Complexity management 
‘Management in highly dynamic environments needs to 
address the increasing complexity of industrial networked 
structures’. Coping with complexity
i
 is a major task of 
management. The approach of optimum variety serves as 
general, constituting formal principle of an organization. 
Referring to Ashby’s work, the optimum variety approach 
implies that a system can only survive if its guidance variety 
respectively complexity is as distinct as the complexity or 
rather variety of the environment surrounding the system [13].  
An important approach in this context can be seen in the 
scale invariance concept which states that the structure of 
complex systems is independent from size [14]. Closely linked 
with this concept is the principle of recurrence which indicates 
that a system, consisting of subsystems, is marked by an 
identical structure on each level and therefore each level itself 
is able to exist independently of the other levels.  
The field of complexity management comprises the 
management of internal or external complexity drivers to such 
an extent that successful guidance of an operation is possible.  
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The concept of corporate fitness adopts Ashby’s logic to 
the organization of enterprises [15]. According to that a 
situational, general optimum has to be pursued by means of 
creating favorable conditions for self-organization, spanning 
between bureaucracy and chaos [16].  
Thus the regulation of a system by means of affecting the 
environment’s complexity should constitute a central approach 
in solving the problem. 
E.  Self-Organization and emergence 
 
A concept seeming appropriate to the initial problem situation 
is that of spontaneous order [17]. Order is understood as the 
non-consciously shaped result of a development process 
marked by individuals adopting their behavior to the 
environment. 
Focussing inter-organizational levels as well as production 
systems, Ueda deals with self-organization and emergence 
phenomena [18]. Emergence describes the development of 
global behavior resulting from local interaction while being 
influenced by the environment [19]. In return the global 
behavior affects the individuals’ objectives and behavior. 
The existing theories in the field of self-organization and 
emergence generally base on the findings of systems theory 
and offer descriptive and explanatory models. These models 
refer to phenomena observable in self-organized systems 
which cannot be derived deterministically from the 
individuals’ behavior. 
Despite their disregard of socio-technical systems these 
theories serve as a frame of reference in this work. 
F.  Organization-theoretical management approaches 
 
In addition to the aforementioned theories scientific 
foundation can be seen in the situational approach, stemming 
from the wide field of managerial organization theory. 
This approach is based on the premise that an effective and 
efficient organization design depends on specific and 
situational conditions. Internal aspects are integrated into the 
design of an organisation in the form of specific success 
determinants for the value creation chain. Thus production 
processes demand other guidance and control instruments than 
development or innovation processes.  
Further external aspects such as industry-specific 
characteristics, cultural aspects or legal restrictions, are 
integrated into the development of organizational concepts 
([20],[21]).  
 
III. NEED FOR ACTION 
 
Pointing out the deficits of current research on network 
organization, it becomes evident that the aim of this work has 
to be the derivation and development of a universally valid 
system of rules supporting the guidance of cooperative value 
creation in development and production networks. 
In contrast to existing approaches in theory and practice 
this work intends to present a rule-based, implicit guidance 
concept which functions as a framework ensuring the 
protection of interests of all network parties in the sense of a 
network optimum. 
The rule-based, implicit guidance of the autonomous, 
polycentric network enterprises shall enable the realization of 
potentials of self-organization in the form of high agility and 
adaptivity. At the same time the new network organization has 
to guarantee a high degree of guidance and hence efficiency in 
order to solve the aforementioned contradicting challenge. 
With respect to the enforcement of regulation, mechanisms 
and principles shall be analysed which are effective in 
decentral organizations consisting of economically and 
judicially independent individuals and hence are not based on 
traditional hierarchical directions and sanctions such as 
exemption. 
In this connection a special focus is put on the analysis of 
incentive schemes as well as logics of accounting for services 
which are supposed to make regulation adherence reasonable 
with respect to the enterprises’ objectives.  
 
For the purpose of an effective and efficient concept 
eliminating the above-mentioned deficits, two conditions have 
to be set.  
The network manager who is usually an active part of the 
value creation process acts as a coordinator and hence guides 
the consolidation of the individual efforts into a coordinated 
system. The manager’s task is defined by harmonizing the 
network enterprises’ activities and thereby trying to channel 
the different identities and hence target systems. 
Rule-based exchange processes, e.g. transactions of 
services, are based on rule-based negotiations. These result 
from the economic and judicial independence of the network 
enterprises. The coordination is undertaken by means of a 
dynamic set of regulations (rules in the sense of code of 
behavior). By doing so an actively organized negotiation 
system evolves that is characterized by market conditions due 
to universal rules. Within the network a market environment 
develops in which the strongly adopted levels and matters of 
service are linked to specific service conditions in a way that 
supports the achievement of the network optimum. 
The set of rules helps in suppressing short-termed 
opportunity actions of individual network partners. Thus the 
network manager creates a framework, henceforth mentioned 
as context, within which a spontaneous, self-organizing order 
is created which aims at leading to the overall network 
optimum [17]. 
This management approach conforms to the systemic-
evolutionary category of management approaches. The context 
can be interpreted as a meta-level which is shaped by the 
management impulses of the network coordinator. Hence 
changes in the context lead to an adoption of the new 
framework on the enterprises’ side. In terms of Ashby’s logic 
a network adopts its inner complexity, e.g., structure and 
processes, to the changed outer complexity, for instance 
market situation [13]. The network manager captures the 
extent of compliance with the regulations as well as the 
absorbed results of the overall network, e.g. in the form of a 
product. The effectiveness of the regulations, i.e. the 
negotiation result, as perceived by the network manager, is 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS APPLICATIONS, ENGINEERING & DEVELOPMENT 
Issue 1, Volume 5, 2011
27
  
accounted for in the subsequent managing activities of the 
manager.  
Both the transformation of the rules making up the context 
and the back coupling of the results to the manager is done by 
processing them through a transformation level. This does not 
only lead to a change in matters but also to a time delay 
concerning the operative transformation. In this context the 
transformation level is not only defined by the network-
inherent characteristics but also by industry-specific principles 
as well as by means of the rivalry situation. 
IV. STRUCTURAL AND PROCESS DESIGN OF 
PRODUCTION NETWORKS 
In recent years cooperation activities between companies 
have increased enormously. The cooperation can reach 
different status and scale for participation partners, depending 
on the common motivation. The target declarations could be 
seen in product enlargement, risk reducing, cost sharing, 
resource sharing or better treatment of complexity for 
example.[22] 
The following two sections give a short overview of the 
theoretical foundations of network theory. 
A.. Structural Design 
There exist various forms of networks. However, all of 
them can be defined by constituting criteria such as 
coordination, duration of cooperation, distribution of power 
and the organization of competencies and capacities between 
the network partners.  
     Coordination is understood as the alignment of the 
individual activities with respect to the overall network aim. 
This alignment results in the various forms of network 
organization which can be found in industrial networks: 
cooperative, competitive, hierarchical and negotiation-based 
[23]. 
     The duration of cooperation simply defines whether a 
network is set up for a short-term period which often happens 
with reference to a specific project or for a long-term period 
which might be the case for initially motivated development 
networks. 
     The organization of capacities and competencies within 
a network needs to be done for the complete network 
organization and requires an intense exchange of information 
between all partners [24]. 
B.  Process Design 
Basically, networks are designed in order to transform the 
win-lose-situation - a consequence of increased competition - 
into a win-win-situation [25]. The network design can be 
divided into three stages. During the first phase decisions have 
to be made answering the basic questions whether cooperation 
should be initialised, at which position in the process chain it 
is useful and which aims define the intended cooperation. The 
second phase represents the selection of the partners. This 
selection should be made according to a strategic and cultural 
fit with respect to the network. Finally, the proposed network 
configuration has to be arranged in line with all participants.  
   In doing so, it has to be taken into account that a too rigid 
construction can be a hindrance in dynamic markets and 
therefore one has to operate quite flexible [26]. Figure 2 
summarizes the process of network initiation. 
     Process-driven network organisations are designed along 
the supply chain; core competences are combined in order to 
gain competitive advantages [27]. 
     In literature, process-driven production networks are 
understood as supply chains characterized by a cross company 
control and planning of goods-, material- and information 
flows along the supply chain. An order-related view relating to 
resources and the work system via network-wide monitoring 
can enable a comprehensive order management as well as 
transparency. Beside a high planning security a distinctive 
adaption- and networking skill is necessary. Often, the 
companies’ behaviour might be harmful for the network 
welfare since the individual companies unveil their interests 
and aims just rarely. 
     The product development and processing time can be 
reduced immensely via synergy effects which might lead to 
sustainable competitive advantages [24]. 
 
1. Initiation
Shall a cooperation be initiated?
What starting point does the cooperation have in the process chain?
What are the overall aims of the cooperation?
2. Partner selection
Partner 1 Partner 2 Partner 3 Partner 4
3. Agreement on the network configuration
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Fig. 2. Network initiation 
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V. DESIGN OF A RULE-BASED NETWORK 
ORGANIZATION 
The following two sections point out a structural and 
process-oriented design for the suggested rule-based network. 
A.  Structural design in a rule-based network 
For the purpose of an effective and efficient concept 
eliminating the above-mentioned deficits, several conditions 
have to be set.  
     The network manager who is usually an active part of 
the value creation process acts as a coordinator and hence 
guides the consolidation of the individual efforts into a 
coordinated system [28]. The manager’s task is defined by 
harmonizing the network enterprises’ activities and thereby 
trying to channel the different identities and hence target 
systems into the direction of the overall network aim. He is 
also the instance who is responsible of integrating all 
information which is relevant for the production process. [29] 
A high extent of identification on part of the network manager 
can be achieved on the one hand by the fact that he is directly 
connected to the outer perception of the network results and 
on the other hand, he is rewarded with a premium for acting as 
a provider towards the clients. The premium can be justified 
because every partner profits from the coordinated network 
activities. 
     The duration of the cooperation in a rule-based network 
depends on the availability of resources. If they exist 
sufficiently a long-term cooperation is favourable because 
trust and a well-balanced network can only arise in the course 
of time. However, short-term cooperation is often determined 
by a specific project when the client postulates a deadline. 
     The coordination is undertaken by means of a dynamic 
set of regulations which are understood as a code of behaviour 
or a value system. By doing so an actively organized 
negotiation system evolves that is characterized by market 
conditions due to universal rules.  
     The set of rules helps in suppressing short-termed 
opportunity actions of individual network partners. Thus the 
network manager creates a framework, henceforth mentioned 
as context, within which a spontaneous, self-organizing order 
is created which aims at leading to the overall network 
optimum [17]. 
B.  Process design in a rule-.based network 
In the following section, the phases of network design 
which have been defined before are presented for a rule-based 
network. The need to create a rule-based production network 
deduces from the research fields’ motivation. In order to live 
up to the complexity of the requested technical systems, it is 
necessary to operate in networks which are both efficient and 
effective. Therefore, it is essential to neutralise the target 
conflict between guidance and flexibility. Ideally the network 
actors jointly source their resources so that they benefit from 
reduced purchasing resources. During the phase of partner 
selection it is essential to pay enough attention so that a 
fundamental, strategic and also cultural fit is ensured. The 
agreement about the configuration of such a network is in 
parts self-organized because only those partners who are able 
to reach an economic benefit join a network. This forms the 
networks’ normative framework. 
     For a successful operating network a cross-company, 
which means network-wide, process control and planning is 
necessary. Concerning the phase of initiation for a rule-based 
production network it can be said that the network should 
include all stages of production. 
In a rule-based network the network manager is entitled to 
this task. Because of his active role within the network, he has 
better knowledge about the processes in the network as an 
external network manager for example. If the manager is to 
influence control and planning in the network, he must have 
abilities and rights that allow him the network-wide control 
and planning. More explicitly, in his central role he needs to 
be supported by an information system for all the relevant 
information concerning process monitoring and securing. This 
implies that the network manager as an active part of the 
network must be familiar with knowledge concerning the 
various phases of production. Ideally, the network managers’ 
company has a highly vertical range of manufacture, so that he 
has a wide knowledge about integrated production processes. 
Furthermore, the network manager is responsible for the 
supervisory control of the material flow and the flow of goods 
which he coordinates on the basis of an appropriate 
information system.  
     Despite the fact that the network manager controls and 
coordinates the processes mentioned above, it is necessary for 
a rule-based network that the network partners’ production 
planning and –control is organised decentralised which means 
that this is done individually by each partner. Otherwise the 
trade-off between flexibility and span-of-control will remain. 
Prior to the production planning and control, an allocation of 
the tasks between the network partners is necessary.  
     For reasons of minimizing the complexity regarding the 
modelling, the network is described with a minimal number of 
actors. The cooperation-partners A and B form the triad’s 
constitutive characteristics as well as the network manager 
who plays an active part in the network himself. Figure 3 
shows a generic example of the triad and the relations between 
the actors. 
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Network partner A Network partner B
Network manager
Rule-based negotiation processes
Rule-based exchange processes  
 
Fig. 3. An exemplary network triad 
VI. MANAGEMENT BY RULES 
Rules are universal and durable restrictions influencing 
individual and collective acting. Thereby the target is to 
structure individual and collective acting. A rule-based 
framework ensures effective and efficient collaboration in 
standard decision making procedures. 
Avadikyan et al. defined rules as follows: “A rule is conceived 
to solve a problem of allocation or creation of resources, it 
serves as a main function which can be of a cognitive, 
incentive or coordination nature, it is ambivalent, i.e. it entails 
side functions in addition to the main one.”
 
[30]  
Within this paper rules can be understood as tools to 
influence individual and collective acting in standard decision-
making procedures and furthermore, due to its properties of 
formal and informal codification degree, as a suitable 
instrument for the steering of individual and especially 
collective behaviour within a specific frame. This specific 
frame can be an alliance or a company network. 
The managing aspect is therefore to develop and to enforce 
rules between the cooperating network companies. Thus, to 
offer an advanced understanding for rules the next chapter 
deals with the characteristics of rules which are characterised 
by the functions coordination, cognition and constraints. 
A.  Coordination, cognition and constraints as influencing 
factors 
When discussin rules, first of all there is the question why 
actors should respect rules and why it is rational to follow 
them. This question will be discussed in the context of the 
three functions coordination, cognition and constraints. [30] 
Coordination, cognition and constraints, every rule or set of 
rules aims at least at one of these properties. They are not 
independent; moreover, they co-exist with a high coherence 
within efficient working organizations. The coordination 
objective is the one which every organization emphasizes. It is 
crucial to bring actors together in order to accomplish the 
common goal. This is necessary because organizations are 
systems with agents of different interests and diverse 
knowledge.
 
[31] 
To gain more efficiency these asymmetries of information 
have to be controlled and thus the organization has to be 
coordinated [31]. This can practically be achieved through 
meetings as formal face-to-face interaction or intensive 
communication supported by information media [32]. 
Furthermore, the coordination aim provides coherence and 
compatibility to every single action. Coordination is always 
associated with a certain scale of control and is dependent on 
the structure of the relation [33]. For instance, in a classical 
hierarchical structure, such as a supplier - manufacturer 
relation the coordination is organized vertically. Contrary, 
coordination patterns are organized horizontally in relations 
with balanced power agreements. Project groups or balanced 
alliances are examples for balanced power agreements. 
The second major role of rules is the constraining objective. 
In an organization governance of behaviour and emergence of 
motivation are daily business. Because of deviant interests 
actors are steered by a reward system such as bonus 
arrangements or sanction mechanisms to generate incentives 
[33]. The set-up phase is a typical example where an enhanced 
tendency for opportunistic behaviour occurs which is caused 
by the lack of trust. This lack of trust can be covered by 
suitable rules which promote the constraining and motivating 
functions.  
The third objective addresses the cognitive objective. The 
cognitive function stresses the organizational learning process. 
To be exact, it describes the crucial processes of maintaining, 
transferring and developing of knowledge and know-how – 
the organization is seen as processor of knowledge. Literature 
differs between several kinds of learning for instance by the 
codification of knowledge such as formal or informal 
knowledge
 
[34] or by the configuration of learning participants 
such as individuals or collectives and by the source of 
knowledge such as extern or internal sources. However, 
focusing on inter-organizational relationships it can be 
separated between interactive and unilateral learning. 
Interactive learning is the cooperative process of two or more 
actors working together on one project or task while learning 
with the partner. The learning output is characterized by tacit 
or collected and rehashed knowledge. Meanwhile the 
unilateral learning process represents a unidirectional learning 
behaviour from a partner, about his abilities and his 
competencies.
 
[35] 
However, the way of learning is central for the cooperation 
process. The success of controlling the learning process and 
thus the cognitive objective is crucial for the collaboration 
success und will influence the actors in their behaviour 
enormously.
 
[35] 
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Rules are suggested as steering tool because they can be 
formulated in a certain scale between informal and formal. 
Corporations or networks are always changing in an 
evolutionary way while adapting the structure and processes to 
aim the optimal market demands. Therefore procedures run 
through certain stages of development and thus, rules first are 
developed tacitly and later gain in importance and finally, will 
be formulated in a codebook, contract or agreement.
 
[31] 
Contrary to promote a more flexible negotiation situation the 
formal status of rules can be suspended and similar tacit rules 
can be established.  
Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between contract-
based networks and rule-based networks. Interorganizational 
relationships are typically based on contracts which are formal 
agreements. Contractual-frameworks establish network 
configurations with a very specific disposition of the network 
actors and establish a distinctive basis for sanction-
mechanism. 
VII. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
The need to particularize these concepts is a consequence of 
the design and process structure of a rule-based production 
network. For the process-oriented organization this is made by 
the analysis of management content for which the dimensions 
“design, control and development” are set in context to the 
considered triad architecture. Thereby, the relevance of each 
dimension within the corresponding network unit will be 
determined. 
     After the clarification of the management contents, it is 
necessary to structure these contents by normative, strategic 
and operative content. Finally, those positions and levels that 
carry a potential for conflicts of interest and information 
asymmetry are being determined. For these positions and 
levels a link to regulations must exist with the aim to prevent 
 opportunistic behaviour. 
     The regulations and their effect for the self-organisation 
in context of the triad production network should be developed 
according to the cause-and-effect-relation in the triad. These 
relations determine the logic and content of the defined set of 
rules. Therefore, the rule dimensions have to be deduced as 
well as a conception which serves as a basis for the rules. 
By means of this kind of network companies are able to 
concentrate as well diversify on a strategic level as opposed to 
the classic organizational view. [36] 
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